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The Privatization Process and Its Effects  






The effects of the privatization process have been widely studied, but with 
controversial results. In many countries this process ended up with public ser-
vice providers still owned by the state (partial privatizations). The paper dis-
cusses how issues related to the privatization process (corruption, conflicts of 
interests and lack of accountability) may be discussed from different perspec-
tives – New Public Management (NPM), New Public Service (NPS), and New 
Public Governance (NPG). While in the NPM the privatization process aims 
at improving efficiency in public service providers, it seems to create some 
ethical problems if analysed from the NPS. Moreover, NPG, as co-production, 
networks and cooperation, offers valid alternatives to the privatization process. 
Through a case study analysis on the public service providers owned by the 
MEF (Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance) the paper highlights the 
stop and go characteristic of the Italian privatization process. This situation 
leads to huge ethical issues. We show the main flaws in the ethical and ac-
countability systems of these organizations suggesting possible solutions using 
a public governance approach. 
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1.  Foreword 
 
Privatization is an important ingredient of market reform programs. These re-
forms are expected to improve economic efficiency by reducing the role of the 
state in the economy. Despite many examples on significant market improve-
ments (Kikeri, Nellis, 2001), the academia, politicians, and the media have re-
cently attacked privatization, voicing concerns about its positive results and its 
impact  on  the  public  interest  (Bayliss,  2002;  Harper,  2000;  Manzetti,  1999; 
Stiglitz,  2002).  Moreover,  in  many  countries  (e.g. Italy),  firms  are  still  con-
trolled by the state. These situations show partial privatization processes.  
The paper emphasises attributes, limits and open-debates related to the 
privatization process, also recognizing the need of public service providers to 
be accountable to citizens. The overall research questions are: which are the 
main reasons leading to partial privatization processes? Is it possible to discuss 
the  privatization  process  from  different  perspectives  (NPM,  NPS,  NPG)? 
Which are the consequences of partial privatization processes on the account-
ability system of public service providers?  
Ethical issues arising from conflicts of interests and corruption of public 
officials may be a reason for the failure of privatizations. As Joseph Stiglitz 
highlighted (2002, page 58): “Perhaps the most serious concern with privatiza-
tion, as it has so often been practiced, is corruption.” Generally, corruption de-
rives from situations of public officials’ conflicts of interest. As result of partial 
privatization processes, it may be possible to find corruption and conflicts of 
interest  in  the  governance  structure  of  public  service  providers.  Therefore, 
there is an urgent need for accountability. 
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, corruption and unethical 
behaviours, related to conflicts of interests, are considered critical aspects for 
the successful definition and implementation of public service providers’ gov-
ernance systems. Second, it contributes to the debate on the attributes and ef-
fects of privatizations, discussed in different perspectives (NPM, NPS, NPG). 
Third, the case study analysis shows the partial privatization process of the Ital-
ian public service providers owned by the MEF and their consequent ethical 
problems. New modes of governance (joined-up governance, network govern-
ance, co-production and cooperation) are considered reasonable alternatives 
(Pestoff, 1992; 2008) to the privatization process. Indeed, a public governance 4    A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
approach  may  stimulate  more  effective  public  service  delivery  assuring  the 
public interest.  
The paper is organized as follows: in section two and three corruption and 
conflicts of interests are discussed in relation to the privatization process. In 
section four, the privatization process is presented from different perspectives. 
Methods are shown in section five. The results are summarized in section six. 
Discussion, findings and future research directions are presented in the last 
two sections. 
 
2. Corruption issues in the privatization process of public  
services 
 
Many countries have implemented large privatization programs, but in many 
others (e.g. in Italy), the state retains a large presence, often across many sec-
tors of the economy (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Privatization  regards  the  changing  of  state  industries  in  manufacturing, 
public utilities, transport and telecommunications. These changes have been 
most apparent in Europe, although experience has been patchy: telecommuni-
cations has largely been privatized; railways are sometimes state-owned, some-
times privately-owned and sometimes in mixed ownership; many countries still 
have state-owned industries. Moreover, there has been a different sign of pri-
vatization or a shift in the activities undertaken by the state in the United States 
or Canada (McLaughlin et al., 2002). 
When looking at the effects of the privatization process, it is not possible 
to come to any conclusions. The results are contrasting. While in some cases 
privatization processes did not reach the declared levels of high quality services 
and market competition, in some others privatizations have had positive ef-
fects on profitability and performance. Nevertheless, partial privatization proc-
esses exist worldwide. However, with privatization, private incentives allowed 
to work improving corporate governance, and productive efficiency at the firm 
level (OECD, 2000). What seems to be clear is that when the privatization 
process resulted in the direct introduction of competition, the benefits to the 




Some of the main criticisms against the privatization process are based on the 
belief that the gains in firm profitability are achieved at the expense of society. 
These gains are claimed to be extracted from consumers through the use of 
market power (Bayliss, 2002). Moreover, the privatization process may affect 
consumer welfare through decreased access, worsened distribution, and lower 
quality of goods and services (Bayliss, Hall, 2000; Freije, Rivas, 2002). Fur-
thermore, the most serious concern with privatization, as it has so often been 
practiced, is corruption. The presence of corruption opportunities in the priva-
tization of state assets is influenced by several factors including the choice of 
privatization method, the implementation phase, and the legal framework.  
In an empirical study Turnovec (1999) demonstrates that privatization in 
the Czech Republic was less successful than official statistics indicate in trans-
ferring state assets to the private sector, partly as a result of corrupt transac-
tions. Stiglitz (2002) suggests that: “In country after country, government offi-
cials have realized that privatization meant that they no longer needed to be 
limited to annual profit skimming. By selling a government enterprise below 
market price, they could get a significant chunk of the asset value for them-
selves rather than leaving it for subsequent officeholders. In effect, they could 
steal today much of what would have been skimmed off by future politicians”. 
Other related contributions include Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Laffont 
and Meleu (1999), who discuss the link between corruption and the decision to 
privatize, and Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) who discuss corruption and 
the optimal design of privatization. 
The privatization process is thus susceptible to corruption. Corruption in 
turn  affects  the  outcome  of  the  privatization  process  in  terms  of  post-
privatization  market  structure  and  therefore  economic  efficiency.  Post-
privatization market structures are in many cases dominated by the large stake 
of the state in public service providers (e.g. Italy). Therefore, there is an urgent 
need for accountability. 
The problem of corruption associated with the privatization process seems 
thus crucial. We do not argue that an increase in corruption in the public sec-
tors is actually caused by the privatization process. Privatization may, in fact, 
be no more than a convenient vehicle for corruption (Kaufmann, Siegelbaum, 
1997). Moreover, differing approaches to the privatization process incorporate 
different factors that can either stimulate or hinder the potential for govern-6    A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
ment officials and their private sector counterparts to engage in corrupt prac-
tices. The fact that the state has still control rights can be associated with level 
of  corruption  in  privatization.  Sources  of  opportunistic  behaviours  depend 
largely upon the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to create new control 
rights or to define old control rights, the exercise of which can be sold to ex-
tract rents. Indeed, maintaining a partial ownership link the government sus-
tains the government official’s direct control rights, with the special opportuni-
ties for rent-seeking that this implies. Where the government retains excep-
tional  governance  powers,  such  as  through  the  use  of  so-called  “golden 
shares”, this risk - and the potential for corruption – increases (Kaufmann, 
Siegelbaum, 1997). 
 
3. Conflicts of interest issues in the privatization process of 
public services 
 
In cases of partial privatization processes, managers of still state-owned firms 
are  often  political  appointees  and  their  employees  were  given  a  status  of 
equivalent to that of the civil servants. Therefore, the impact of their actions 
seems to directly relate to the citizens (clients or customers).  
Their actions are relevant issues for ethical considerations. Moreover, the 
recent scandals in the public sectors, let us think about the importance of ethi-
cal systems which avoid conflicts of interest that might lead to corruption and 
unethical  behaviours  in  public  services.  In  fact,  in  the  last  years,  ministers, 
agencies, central and local administrations are often involved together in public 
services provision with shared responsibilities. Thus, citizens can perceive as 
complex, incoherent and even useless this distribution of responsibility and 
competences. Questions on ethics, accountability and governance become im-
peratives for all governments, because of this crisis of legitimacy. The impor-
tance of renewal of the ethical system and its introduction in the governance 
structure of public service providers is thus crucial. In doing so, it is important 
to take into account that public sector employees can face conflicts, especially 
when personal goals are not consistent with maximising the benefits of citi-
zens. Public officials can face a conflict when they are able to advantage their 




tion of these conflicts rests on the principle that public officials have an obliga-
tion to look after the interests of all shareholders. That theoretical simplicity of 
goals and principles does not seem to hold sway in the public sector. Showing 
many partial privatization processes, the current situation let us think about the 
importance of understanding what a conflict of interest is, and how it may be 
avoided in public service providers. This aspect becomes more critical in these 
firms because of the involvement of the public interest.  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has undertaken extensive work on conflicts of interest in public sector and has 
developed the following simple and practical definition: A ‘conflict of interest’ 
involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public of-
ficial, in which the public official has private interests which could improperly 
influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities (OECD, 
2006). While conflicts of interest should be avoided wherever possible, con-
flicts often happen without anyone’s fault. Conflicts of interest can – if not 
identified, disclosed and managed effectively – cause public officials to put pri-
vate interests above the public interest; thereby compromising their work and 
creating a catalyst for serious misconduct and corruption. Public service pro-
viders and also the other public sector organizations must ensure that conflicts 
of interest are seen to be managed in a transparent and accountable manner. 
The perception that conflicts of interest are not being managed properly can 
undermine confidence in the integrity of public officials and public sector or-
ganizations (OECD, 2005). In many cases having a code of ethics with pre-
scriptions on conflict of interest and sanctions, may be helpful. This is also 
needed because of the growing sense among the public in western democracies 
that  corruption  by  public  officials  is  increasing  (Chapman,  O’Toole,  1995; 
Frederickson, 1999). There is a significant shift in public service ethical stan-
dards and, subsequently, in unethical behaviour (Bovens, 2008; Hondeghem, 
1998; OECD, 2000; Van Wart, Berman, 1999). Those considerations lead us to 
the consciousness that something must change in public sector organizations. 
The importance of citizens’ interest and the need to focus on public value lead 
us to consider strategically the accountability system that each public organiza-
tion could adopt. This becomes more important in public service providers 
which are still state-owned. In those cases the adoption of businesslike method 
must be accomplished with the consideration of the public interest and value, 8    A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
and with the right tools for improving effective accountability to the citizens. 
 
4. The privatization process through the lens of New Public 
Management, New Public Service, New Public Governance 
 
The privatization process is aimed at shifting, functions and responsibilities, in 
whole and in part, from the government to the private sector through such ac-
tivities as contracting out or asset sales. The definition seems useful because it is 
encompassing (Bozeman, 2007). A broad definition serves best simply because it 
covers the many activities that are generally referred to as “ privatization”.  
It is often common refer to privatization as a mechanism or a tool of the 
NPM perspective; but it is not appropriate and correct. The NPM is a set of ap-
proaches to public management reforms and it seems possible to look at the pri-
vatization process as a mechanism used during the NPM for realizing public sec-
tor reforms. However, we are careful in stating that, because, there are several 
distinctions  between  NPM  and  privatization.  First,  privatization  is  the  older 
term. The term entered the dictionary around 1968. This makes the terms about 
fifteen years senior of NPM. A second distinction seems that the NPM seems to 
have more management strategy trappings than privatization (Bozeman, 2007). 
Indeed, privatization is about moving public performance and functions to the 
private sector, but NPM includes many other trappings such as, for example, 
viewing the client as a customer. It is perhaps accurate to say that privatization is 
a broad tool kit, whereas NPM is, as advertised, an approach to management re-
form. But it would be a mistake to make any hard-and-fast claims about specifics 
boundaries between NPM and privatization. The privatization process is a fun-
damental tool to be used for re-organizing the national states. Indeed, it turned 
the so called state-owned firms in more market-oriented entities. 
NPM is a paradigmatic break from the traditional model of public admini-
stration (Hood, 1991). Public sector reforms have been a common experience 
across the world despite its different forms (Pollit, Bouckaert, 2004). During this 
era several countries became exemplars of NPM (e. g. New Zealand and Austra-
lia). More recently, however, cracks have appeared and the need of new way of 
thinking on public management practice has begun to be addressed to the weak-




in particular the public value approach is attracting considerable interest (Boze-
man, 2002; Hartley, 2005; Hefetz, Warner, 2004; Smith et al., 2004; Stocker, 
2006). A new paradigm on government activity, policy making and service deliv-
ery may emerge bringing with it important implications for public managers. In 
this new light also the privatization process assumes a new shape. Authors start 
to look at negative effects of the privatization processes that often results in par-
tial processes with no improvement of public service values for citizens. They try 
to address the main lacks of these partial processes to the existence of corrup-
tion and ethical problems that might arise from conflicts of interests among 
various actors. These arguments come from authors that highly contested the 
concept (Groot, Budding, 2008). Indeed, in recent years, it seems that the appre-
hension for the potentially negative impact of privatization on the ethics of pub-
lic officials has been strengthened by highly publicized scandals in many OECD 
countries. Besides, there is an increasing concern about the impact of NPM re-
forms on public officials’ ethics (Maesschalck, 2004). Authors from the U.S. 
context, also forcefully expresses their concerns about the ethical consequences 
of  NPM  innovations  such  as  privatizing  and  they  argue  for  a  re-regulation 
(Frederickson 1999). Some other authors argued what has recently been labelled 
the New Public Service (Denhardt, Denhardt, 2000). They show NPS as an al-
ternative to the dichotomy between the old public administration and the NPM. 
They propose new mechanisms in which the primary role of the public official is 
to help citizens, meeting their interests rather than attempt to control or steer 
society. Contrasting the NPM, the NPS recognizes also that the relationship be-
tween government and its citizens is not the same as that in a business activity 
between the firm and its customers. Therefore, the privatization process is seen 
as a market-based mechanism and because of its failure in some contexts be-
comes inappropriate, also for the ethical problems that arise from its application. 
Following the NPS, therefore, the privatization process seems to be inappropri-
ate but the emphasis is more on ethical issues relating to public officials’ behav-
iour rather than directly to that process. 
A reasonable alternative (Pestoff, 1992; 2008) to the privatization process is 
given  by  the  New  Public  Governance  perspective.  This  perspective  includes 
many modes of governance (e. g. joined-up governance, network governance, 
co-production and cooperation). These are looked as alternatives to the privati-
zation process in public service provisions; it seems also that they might be able 10   A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
to solve many of the above-described issues (corruption, conflicts of interest, 
and unethical behaviour). These problems are partially solved through participa-
tory citizenship in the government of complex issues like the public service de-
livery (Klijn, 2008).  
This discussion has pointed out how the privatization process assumes dif-
ferent meanings and aspects in relation to different perspectives (NPM, NPS, 
NPG). What seems to emerge is that in times of partial privatizations, deregula-
tion in public service delivery and reorganization processes, the shape and the 
power of the governing bodies are constantly changing. Some questions arise: 
does the accountability system keep up with these developments? Moving from 
NPM, NPS to NPG approaches would better address the over-mentioned issues 
and grant the public interest for citizens? Could be the implementation of an ac-





This paper builds on a descriptive case studies analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). The analysis is on the Italian privatization process. Two main reasons 
lead us to this case selection. First, it shows the general phenomenon of partial 
privatization processes in sectors which are strategic for citizens.  
The  MEF  (Ministry  of  Economics  and  Finance)  owned  many  firms  in-
volved in the public services provision. At the same time those public service 
providers move into businesslike methods to improve efficiency and perform-
ance. Our focus is on their ethical and accountability systems. The aim is to 
identify if in cases of partial privatization processes, citizens have more risks on 
their public interest and value. This aspect is important in order to give an ex-
haustive picture of the actual status of the Italian privatization process and of 
public service providers’ accountability system.  
This qualitative case oriented research (Yin, 2003) helps to modify and ex-
pand the theory on the privatization process giving also contribution to studies 
on accountability in the public sector.  
The case analysis is structured in two main parts: a. the analysis of the situa-
tion pre and post privatization process; b. the formal and content analysis of 





6. The Italian case: the privatization process and its effects on 
the accountability system 
 
The privatization process in Italy was characterized by a stop and go dynamic 
(Marelli,  Stroffolini,  1998).  Privatizations  realized between  1992  ad  1999 as 
185,000 billion lire (more than €95 billion), which accounts for 12.3% of the 
GNP in 1992. This gave relief to the state finances, and it can be considered a 
success (De Nardis, 2000). However, privatizations did not necessarily translate 
into a real shift of control over privatized businesses.  
Privatizations in the industrial sector involved many cases of actual transfer 
of control, but in other significant cases, the state maintained more than 50% 
of the shares. As shown in the theoretical discussion on the privatization proc-
ess in the  NPM perspective, it downsizes the public sector; whereas NPM 
seeks  the  improvement  of  public  sector  management  by  adopting  business 
management practices. But it is not difficult to say that some scholars treat pri-
vatization as one of the unequivocal features of NPM. Indeed, in this paradigm 
there is too much emphasis on results-based performance and that is what par-
tially happened also with the privatization process. Moreover, because of pub-
lic officials’ corruption and unethical behaviour this market-type mechanism 
may threaten public accountability. This is due to the split created between 
purchasers (citizens, clients, customers) and service providers. Actually, this 
creates public confusion regarding who is actually responsible for the service 
delivery. 
 
6.1  Pre-privatization and post-privatization: the Italian situation 
 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the state sector in Italy was large and perva-
sive. State-owned Enterprises (SOE) were conceived as industrial and social 
policy instruments rather than profit maximizing entities. They typically oper-
ated under strong political interference. As a consequence, their operating and 
financial performance was very weak as compared to private firms. Under the 
pressure of debt and deficits, Italy’s fiscal conditions rapidly deteriorated at the 
beginning of the 1990s. In 1993, Italy embarked in a large-scale privatization 12   A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
process mainly aimed at fiscal stabilization as a requisite to join the European 
Monetary Union (Goldstein, Nicoletti, 2003; Classens, Fan, 2002).  
The results have been outstanding. Over a decade, Italy implemented 70 
major sales of privatization proceeds mainly through public offers of shares, 
placing Italy in the third and fourth position in the global ranking by revenues 
and transactions, respectively (Goldstein, Nicoletti, 2003). The more immedi-
ate steps have been the transformation of state entities operating under public 
law into corporations and the centralization of decision-making in the hands of 
the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF). The control structure of the 
SOE sector was extremely complex and characterized by the involvement of 
different state holding companies, public entities, ministries or local govern-
ment bodies (see figure 1). 
Until 1992, the majority of state assets were owned by three large holding 
companies: IRI , ENI  and EFIM , under the direct control of the Ministry of 
state holdings. The most important public entities were ENEL, the electricity 
state monopoly, IMI, a special credit financial institution, and BNL (one of the 
most important banks). The largest entities owned by ministries were FS, oper-
ating in the railway system, and PP.TT, managing the postal and telecommuni-
cation services (Goldstein, Nicoletti, 2003). Public firms were more conceived 
as instruments for industrial and social policies and not surprisingly, their fi-
nancial and operating performance was generally poor. The privatization policy 
was needed. The objectives of the privatization program are officially stated by 
the MEF and presented to the Parliament on November 1992. The MEF had 
the duty of formulating proposals on privatization to a committee of three 
ministries – MEF, Budget and Planning, and Industry – and final decisions had 
to be approved by the Council of the Ministries, chaired by the Prime Ministry. 
However, the MEF has been playing the key role of agenda setter in privatiza-











Figure 1: The Control of State-Owned Enterprises as of 1992 
 
Source: Goldstein and Nicoletti (2003) 
 
During 1996-2000, the Italian privatization process, not differently from the 
rest of the world, reaches its peak. The last stage of the privatization process 
has two main features consisting in much smaller in scale with respect to pre-
vious years and characterized by private equity placements and block transac-
tions to institutional investors. These new aspects of the privatization process 
are obviously related and determined by the changed market conditions which 
slowed the privatization process worldwide. Indeed, governments do not want 
to sell shares in a depressed market. Furthermore, selling new shares of a par-
tially privatized company at a price lower than the initial public offering price 
would force initial investors to realize a capital loss (Megginson, 2003). This 
changing environment has forced the Italian government to shift the privatiza-
tion method from public offers to private sales, and when this was not possi-
ble, to tap institutional instead of retail investors. 
Looking at the current situation (see figure 2), the focus is on the MEF and 
on the public service providers owned by it. As in the majority of developed 
countries, the MEF is still an influential shareholder in several privatized com-
panies, such as ENI, ENEL, Finmeccanica, and Alitalia. Furthermore, it still 
fully owns FS, the railway system operator, and RAI (Italian Radio Television) 
the television broadcasting company. The MEF is the holding of this public 14   A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
group of firms operating in the public service delivery and therefore it deter-
mines their governance system. Planning and control functions are performed 
by the MEF that influences also the governance structure of public service 
providers.  
 
Figure 2: The current situation of public service providers owned by the MEF 
 
Source: Ministry of Economics and Finance 2007. 
 
As shown in figure 2, it seems that the Italian privatization process is now 
stopped. Moreover, the effects of this process are not immediately visible. Ac-
countability practices are not well implemented. Therefore, the effects of the 
privatization process are disputed and contested and ethical concerns emerge. 
The need for accountability and ethical behaviour in managing public services 
is clear, especially if the partial privatization process will remain as it is now. 
Then, that means accountability infrastructures are needed more urgently than 
ever in the current Italian situation. What is already happened and what is go-
ing to happen in the Italian public service management will be determined by 
the governance structure of public service providers owned by the MEF.  
Other questions arise: what is the role of citizens? Are they: citizens, cus-
tomers and/or clients? What would be an adequate level of accountability? 
How to make sure that transparency, ethical prescriptions and accountability 




The next section shows the current status of codes of ethics adopted in Italian 
public service providers (controlled by the MEF). The main focus is on ethical 
aspects and norms related to corruption and conflicts of interest prevention to 
assure the public interest.  
 
6.2  The ethical structure 
 
Recently the relevance of ethical concerns has encouraged the implementation 
of initiatives to restore confidence and maintain integrity in businesses. In line 
with this, the adoption of a code of ethics is a step towards improving the ethi-
cal culture in today’s public sector. 
The term ‘‘code of ethics’’ is defined as written standards that are reasona-
bly designed to deter wrongdoing and, to promote honest and ethical conduct, 
including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest be-
tween personal and professional relationships; full, fair, accurate, timely and 
understandable disclosure in reports and documents; compliance with applica-
ble governmental laws, rules and regulations; the prompt internal report on 
violations of the code to an appropriate person or person identified in the 
code; and accountability for adherence to the code. 
In public service providers well defined ethical structure may help to man-
age conflicts of interest.  
Mandatory codes of ethics have been introduced only recently in Italy for 
public service providers (Law no. 231/2001). This is the result of changes in 
systems of public administration and it reflects the effort to newly defined gen-
erally valid ethical values. The new codes outline values and ethical principles 
that should guide public officials in their professional activities.  
The ethics codes of public service providers owned by the MEF were ana-
lysed. The content analysis will help to identify existing and potential ethical 
concerns faced by those firms in the current Italian context. In order to carry 
out the content analysis, we made an extensive review of the previous literature 
about the contents of ethical codes. A recent review can be obtained in Helin 
and  Sandstrom  (2007),  who  distinguish  between  content-oriented,  output-
oriented and transformation-oriented studies. We took as a basis several stud-
ies of content analysis in different countries (Bondy et al., 2004; O’Dwyer, 
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We selected codes of ethics disclosed on the Internet and their contents were 
thoroughly analysed (ethical principles, values, norms, rules of conduct). We 
collected codes both in English and Italian language. The analysis was on the 
current version of the codes. The aim was to identify ethical guidelines. We 
looked  for  indications  of  how  corruption  and  conflicts  of  interest  were 
avoided. Much of the attention was on well defined sanctions.  
Despite the new regulation, some of the analysed public service providers 
have not disclosed the code of ethics on their website. From the 26 public ser-
vices providers owned by the MEF, 22 disclosed the code of ethics (84.7%).  
With regard to activity sector, firms which operate in the same sector are 
likely to adopt similar patterns in the preparation of an ethics code. In some 
firms that did not make one (15,3%), contrary to the tendency in its sector 
(employment service and insurance, 7%), such a strategy would be adversely 
interpreted by markets. 
The results of our content analysis are reported, underlining the main top-
ics the codes deal with. Before studying more deeply the topics analysed in the 
codes, it would be of interest to analyse several formal aspects: title, extension, 
date and scope of application. Concerning the title of the document, most 
firms simply use the denomination ‘‘Code of Conduct of X’’ (38.46 %). Other 
titles  reported  are  ‘‘Ethical  Standards’’  (15.38%),  “Standards  of  Ethics  and 
Conduct of” (23.07%), “Code of Ethics” (7.6%).  
With  regard  to  their  length,  the  mean  length  is  approximately  fourteen 
pages. Nevertheless, there are larger codes, such as 23 or 30 pages. 
Regarding the date, most codes were drawn up and took effect four or five 
years ago (36.6 % from 2001 to 2003, 45.5% from 2004 to 2006, and 17.9% 
from 2007 to 2008).  
The scope of the analysed codes takes in mainly employees and the cus-
tomers, emphasizing the ethical role played by managers, directors and partially 
public officials.  
Focusing on the content, codes are mainly imperative codes, stating a guide 
for standards of conduct that firms would like their actors to follow. The struc-
ture of the codes usually show two blocks: a first block, which states the values 
and basic principles encouraged by the firm, whereas the second block trans-
lates the principles into certain standards of conduct for the actors in their in-




The 45.4% of the analysed codes miss a clear statement of their values and 
principles. The 36.4% lacks indications on detailed norms of conduct. Tools of 
promotion and sensitization to the importance of the public interest and value 
are present in only the 18.2% of cases.  
The analysed codes are usually made up of provisions covering the follow-
ing areas: use of public resources for personal benefit (31%); definition of the 
target group to which the code is addressed to (23.6%); duties to the public in 
confrontation with private interests (22.8%); definition of behaviour or con-
duct constituting violation of the code (13.6%); statement of preventing con-
flict of interests (9%); sanctions in case of violations (0%). 
From the analysis, it seems that many codes are characterized by general 
contents containing fewer principles expressed often in terms of 'ought' or 
should (and not 'must'). Many are also ambiguous or unclear. The main ethical 
concerns in the analysed public service providers have to do with the absence 
of information on conflicts of interest disclosure. Moreover, none of the ana-
lysed codes have been characterized by a formulation process that includes 
consultation with citizens or their representations. Probably these are the ma-
jor lacks emerging from the analysis.  
Ethical aspects seem critical in the governance system of the MEF and its 
public service providers. Accountability, transparency, openness, public offi-
cials’ duties, complex relationships among actors, public interests, and values 
are all key aspects to take into account. It seems to us that the analysed codes 
of ethic fulfil the role of compulsory documents. They simply suggest guide-
lines that are quite similar to a code of practice. The analysis shows clearly that 
the introduction of ethical issues in public service providers is at a beginning 
stage. 
 
7. Discussion and findings 
 
Our results show that actions in favour of accountability and ethical issues 
have not been considered in detail during privatizations. In fact, in the analysed 
public service providers codes of ethics have been adopted quite recently. This 
is partially justified by the complex implementation of the accountability struc-
ture. Moreover, it seems now time for “re-inventing” the privatization process. 
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in the NPM, the emphasis on ethical and accountability aspects of the privati-
zation  process  becomes  more  evident  in  the  NPS  perspective.  Finally,  the 
NPG offers valid alternative to privatizations (Pestoff, 1992; 2008) including in 
the governance process citizens as key actors.  
When approaching the privatization process, a wide host of management 
techniques and forms of organizing social life may be valid alternatives. That 
may challenge conventional practices and seemingly natural linkages within the 
on-going debate. Moreover, recognizing that the current social services provi-
sion by public service providers is lacking in quality and effectiveness gives 
more reasons to believe that experiments and combinations with accountability 
and privatization may be desirable.  
The paper analysed the Italian privatization process, underlining its stop 
and  go  characteristic.  In  Italy  many  public  service  providers  are  still  state-
owned, and the current market competition is not effective. A major emphasis 
on accountability is needed. Considerations on citizens’ public interest are due. 
Public service providers have many stakeholders and they are particularly visi-
ble to citizens. Issues of legitimacy become important. The use of codes of eth-
ics may legitimize public officials’ actions ensuring that their effects fall within 
the norms of society.  
This is a critical point for public service providers owned by the MEF. 
Evidences from the analysis (content analysis of codes of ethics) suggest that 
these actions in line with ethical and accountable procedures are sporadic, un-
structured,  and  introduced  recently.  The  lack  of  accountability  is  the  main 
weakness of their governance structure. Probably, the lack of evidence of any 
real efficiency associated to the privatization process gains and the decline in 
accountability produced by restructuring and downsizing public services is thus 
evident (Minogue, 2000). Although a window dressing may be likely, the dis-
closure of the codes of ethics on the Internet reveals a public commitment 
with stakeholders, not just an internal procedure. This seems a good starting 
point. 
Governmental reforms are needed in order to use market principles and to 
outsource public goods and services. But nowadays, the public sector with its 
modern representative democracy can be described as a concatenation of prin-
cipal-agent relationships (Strom, 2003). Hence, public accountability is an es-




zens  and  their  representatives with  the  information  needed  for  judging  the 
propriety and effectiveness of government.  
Evidences from the codes of ethics analysis show that many problems still 
refer to how the fundamental values of public service organizations have been 
undermined by this partial privatization process (Lawton, 1998). Besides, po-
litical and policy considerations are significant and pervade leadership, strategy 
and management of public service organizations. This is also visible in the cur-
rent Italian context.  
It is needed to define, operationalize, measure and evaluate public services 
and public services organizations. Relations and communications between the 
government and the citizens become fundamental. New modes of governance, 
more citizens-oriented go in that direction (Klijn, 2008; Pestoff, 2008). The at-
tention is on NPG (Osborne 2006) with its emphasis on partnership, network-
ing  (Klijn, 2008) and lateral modes of organizing than the vertical command 
and control forms typical of the NPM (Newman, 2001). It also takes a more 
pragmatic view on public services that can be delivered publicly and privately. 
The more general concept of public governance (Osborne, 2006) often in-
cludes  administration,  stakeholder  pluralism,  management  within  networks, 
and legitimacy (Frederickson, 1997). These new modes of governance may ad-
dress the accountability deficit in the MEF governance structure. The analysis 
shows that accountability tools are often introduced through pilots, or incre-
mentally to build support for more inclusive and transparent governance (Bov-
ens et al., 2008).  
The lack of accountability has been the bigger concern, particularly with 
regard to the privatization process (Braithwaite, 2006). Mandatory codes of 
ethics  are  not  enough,  but  a  good  starting  point.  Surely,  other  means  are 
needed to promote a high level of public services and the implementation and 
compliance of those codes seems to be essential. However, a code imposed 
from on high will not fit the bill, if the goal is to produce a document of shared 
values. More citizens’ participation through a bottom-up process may fill the 
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8. Conclusions and future research directions 
 
It seems that ethics and accountability are gaining prominence in the govern-
ance debate. There is a perception that standards in public life are in decline. 
This raises questions about the costs of misconduct by who have been en-
trusted with guarding the public interest. These arguments are particularly rele-
vant in public service providers. The paper shows that the perception of a fall 
in public standards is linked to the shifting role of the state, which is undergo-
ing tremendous reform. 
The privatization has been a starting point, but now the question is on how 
to ensure standards of quality and efficiency in public services. As a result, 
public service providers are under pressure to transform. The goal is to meet 
this demand for accountability. This is possible through the disclosure, man-
agement and prohibition of public officials’ conflicts of interest. Therefore, 
well-designed  accountability  mechanisms  have  to  be  introduced  and  imple-
mented. Indeed, the decision-makers in public service providers may have the 
opportunity to explain and justify their actions. Citizens and interest groups 
may thus address questions and offer different opinions.  
Contemporary theory and practice of public policy-making and public ser-
vice delivery stress their increasingly pluricentric, multilevel, networked, hybrid, 
and fluid nature (Rhodes, 1997). That is the emergent approach. However, 
when public policy is produced in complex networks featuring multiple, over-
lapping coordination mechanisms, the identification and make up of account-





AA.VV. (2001), Economia e diritto nella privatizzazione delle imprese italiane. Il caso 
ENI,  in  CAFFERATA  R.,  Quaderni  di  Studi  sull'Impresa,  Giappichelli, 
Torino. 
BAYLISS K. (2002), “Privatization and Poverty: The Distributional Impact of 
Utility Privatization”, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, vol.73, n.4b, 




BONDY K., MATTEN D., MOON J. (2004), “The Adoption of Voluntary Codes 
of Conduct in MNCs: A Three-Country Comparative Study”, Business & 
Society Review, vol.109, n.4, pp. 449-477. 
BORGONOVI E. (2000), Principi e sistemi aziendali per le amministrazioni pubbliche, 
EGEA, Milano. 
BOUCKAERT  G.,  POLLIT  C.  (2000),  Public  Management  Reform.  A  comparative 
Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
BOVENS M., SCHILLEMANS T., HART P. (2008), “Does public accountability 
work? An assessment tool”, Public Administration, vol.86, n.1, pp. 225-242. 
BOX  R.C.,  MARSHALL  G.S.,  REED  B.J.,  REED  C.M.  (2001),  “New  Public 
Management  and  Substantive  Democracy”,  Public  Administration  Review, 
vol.61, n.5, pp. 608-619. 
BOZEMAN B. (2002), “Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not 
Do”, Public Administration Review, vol.62, n.2, pp.145-161. 
BOZEMAN  B.  (2007),  Public  values  and  public  interest:  counterbalancing  economic 
individualism, D.C. Georgetown University Press, Washington. 
BRAITHWAITE  J.  (2006),  “Accountability  and  Responsibility  through 
Restorative Justice”, in Dowdle M., Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas 
and Experiences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
CHAPMAN  R.A.,  O’TOOLE  B.J.  (1995),  “The  Role  of  the  Civil  Service:  a 
Traditional View  in a  Period  of  Change”,  Public Policy  and Administration, 
vol.10, n.2, pp. 3-20. 
CLASSENS  S.,  FAN  J.  (2002),  “Corporate  Governance  in  Asia:  a  Survey”, 
International Review of finance, vol.3, n.2, pp. 71-103.  
DE NARDIS S. (2000), “Privatizzazioni, liberalizzazioni, sviluppo: Introduzione 
e sintesi”, in De Nardis S., Le Privatizzazioni Italiane, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
DENHARDT R.B., DENHARDT J.V. (2000), “The New Public Service: Serving 
Rather than Steering”, Public Administration Review,  vol.60, n.6, pp. 549-559. 
EISENHARDT K.M. (1989), “Building Theories From Case Study Research”, 
Academy Of Management Review, vol.14, n.4, pp. 532-550.  
FREDERICKSON  H.G.  (1999),  “Public  Ethics  and  the  New  Managerialism”, 
Public Integrity, vol.1, n.3, pp. 265-278. 
FREIJE S., RIVAS L. (2002), “Privatization, Inequality and Welfare: Evidence 
from  Nicaragua”,  Unpublished,  Caracas,  Centro  Desarrollo  Humano  y 
Organizaciones, (IESA), Venezuela. 22   A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
GOLDSTEIN A., NICOLETTI G. (2003), “Privatization in Italy 1993-2002: Goals, 
Institutions,  Outcomes  and  Outstanding  Issues”,  Unpuplished,  CESifo 
Conference on Privatization Experiences in the EU. 
GROOT T., BUDDING T. (2008), “New Public Management’s Current Issues 
And Future Prospects”, Financial Accountability & Management, vol.24, n.1, 
pp. 1-13. 
HARPER  J.  (2002),  “The  Performance  of  Privatized  Firms  in  the  Czech 
Republic”,  Journal of Banking and Finance, vol.26, pp. 621-649. 
HARTLEY J. (2005), “Innovation in Governance and Public Services: Past and 
Present”, Public Money and Management, vol.25, n.1, pp. 27-34. 
HEFETZ A., WARNER M. (2004), “Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the 
Dynamics  of  the  Government  Contracting  Process”,  Journal  of  Public 
Administration Research and Theory, vol.14, n.2, pp. 171-190. 
HELIN S., SANDSTROM J. (2007), “An inquiry into the study of corporate codes 
of ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics, vol.75, n.3, pp. 253-271. 
HINNA L., MENEGUZZO M., MUSSARI R., DECASTRI M. (2006), Economia delle 
aziende pubbliche, McGraw-Hill, Milano. 
HONDEGHEM A. (1998), Ethics and Accountability in a context of Governance and 
New Public Management, IOS Press, Amsterdam. 
HOOD  C.  (1991),  “A  Public  Management  for  All  Seasons?”,  Public 
Administration, vol.69, n.1, pp. 3-19. 
KAUFMANN  D.,  SIEGELBAUM  P.  (1997),  “Privatization  and  corruption  in 
transition economies”, Journal of International Affairs, vol.50, n.2, pp. 419-458. 
KIKERI S., NELLIS J. (2001), “Privatisation in Competitive Sectors: The Record 
so  Far”  in  mimeo,  Private  Sector  Advisory  Services,  D.C.:  World  Bank, 
Washington. 
KLIJN  E.  H.  (2008),  “Governance  and  Governance  Networks  in  Europe”, 
Public Management Review, vol.10, n.4, pp. 505-525. 
LA  PORTA  R.,  LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES  F.,  SHLEIFER  A.,  VISHNY  R.  (2002), 
“Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation”, Journal of Finance, vol.57, 
pp.1147-1170. 
LAFFONT J.J., MELEU M. (1999), “A Positive Theory of Privatization for Sub-
Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Economics, vol.60, pp. 271-295. 
LAWTON A. (1998), Ethical Management for the Public Services, Open University 




MAESSCHALCK J. (2004), “The impact of New Public Management reforms on 
Public Servants’ ethics: Toward a Theory”, Public Administration, vol.82, n.2, 
pp. 465-489. 
MANZETTI L. (1999), Privatization South America Style, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
MARELLI M., STROFFOLINI F. (1998),  “Privatization in Italy, a tale of capture”, 
in Parker D., Privatization in the European Union. Theory and Policy Perspectives, 
Routledge, London and New York.  
MCLAUGHLIN  K.,  OSBORNE  S.P.,  FERLIE,  E.  (2002),  New  public  management: 
current trends and future prospects, Routledge, London and New York. 
MEGGINSON W.L., JEFFRY M.N. (2001), “From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.2, pp. 
321-389. 
NEWMAN J. (2001), Modernising Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society, Sage, 
London. 
OECD (2000), Privatisation, competition and regulation, Centre for Co-operation 
with Non-Members, Paris, France. 
OECD (2005), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector – A Toolkit, Paris, 
France. 
OECD (2006), Public Ethics and Governance: Standards and Practices in Comparative 
Perspective, Elsevier Ltd. 
O’DWYER  B.,  MADDEN  G.  (2006),  “Ethical  codes  of  conduct  in  Irish 
companies: a survey of code content and enforcement procedures”, Journal 
of Business Ethics, vol.63, n.3, pp. 217-236. 
OSBORNE S. (2006), “The new public governance?”, Public Management Review, 
vol.8, n.3, pp. 377-387. 
PARKER D., SAAL D.  (2003), International Handbook on Privatization, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham. 
PESTOFF  V.  (1992),  “Cooperative  Social  Services  An  Alternative  to 
Privatization”, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol.15, pp. 21-45. 
PESTOFF V. (2008), “Citizens as Co-Producers of Welfare Services: Childcare 
in eight European countries”, Public Management Review, vol.8, n.4, pp. 503-
520. 
POLLITT C., BOUCKAERT G. (2004), Public Management Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 24   A. CALABRÒ 
 
 
RHODES  R.A.W.  (1997),  Understanding  Governance,  policy  networks,  governance, 
reflexivity and accountability, Open University Press: Buckingham. 
SHLEIFER A., VISHNY, R.W. (1998), The grabbing hand, government pathologies and 
their cures, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
SMITH  R.F.I.,  ANDERSON  E.,  TEICHER  J.  (2004),  “Toward  Public  Value?”, 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol.63, n.4, pp. 14-15. 
STIGLITZ  J.  (2002),  Globalization  and  Its  Discontents, Allen  Lane/The  Penguin 
Press, London. 
STOKER  G.  (2006),  “Public  Value  Management:  A  New  Narrative  for 
Networked Governance?”, American Review of Public Administration, vol.36, 
n.1, pp. 41-57. 
STROM K. (2003), “Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation’ in K. Strom”, in 
Müller  W.  and  Bergman  T.,  Delegation  and  Accountability  in  Parliamentary 
Democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
TURNOVEC  F.  (1999),  “Privatization,  ownership  structure  and  transparency: 
how  to  measure  the  true  involvement  of  the  state”,  European  Journal  of 
Political Economy, vol.15, pp. 605-18. 
VAN  WART  M.,  BERMAN  E.M.  (1999),  “Contemporary  Public  Sector 
Productivity Values”, Public Productivity and Management Review, vol.22, n.3, 
pp. 326-348. 













cop_11.qxd  4-10-2010  9:17  Pagina 1